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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2. 
This is an appeal from a final Order in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT 
APPELLANT FAILED TO STRICTLY OR SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT WHEN DISMISSING HER 
COMPLAINT. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 Herbertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 
P.2d 839, 840 & n.l (Utah 1995). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court will 
consider "all of the facts and evidence presented, and every reasonable inference arising therefrom, 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing the Motion." Katzenberger v. State. 735 P.2d 405, 
408 (Utah 1987). Further, because summary judgment presents only questions of law, this court 
accords no deference to the trial court's ruling and reviews it for correctness. Mumford v. ITT 
Commercial Fin. Corp.. 858 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah 1993). 
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 As in Herbertson. here the trial court considered more than just the pleadings 
making his determination and therefore, the ruling is best characterized as a grant of summary 
judgment. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Statutes and Rules are determinative of the question at issue in this appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11(2) 
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of the employees duties withda the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. . . (3)(b) the notice of claim 
shall be: (i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent or legal guardian; and (ii) directed and delivered to: D the 
president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against a special 
district... 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12: 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion:. . . (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person . . .(6) failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted,... 
If, on a motion asserting the defense (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56: 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is not made at any time 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all any parts thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The 
judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is to entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of The Case And Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff/Appellant Teresa Greene brought this action in the Third Judicial District Court to 
recover compensation for injuries she sustained as a result of being thrown to the floor of a UTA bus 
when it prematurely left a busstop before the passenger was safely seated. She filed a Complaint 
which was not answered by Defendant but was instead met with a Motion to Dismiss. The Motion 
asserted that Plaintiff improperly served her Notice of Claim upon the appropriate party within 
UTA's organization and hence the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit and the 
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
After permitting limited discovery into factual issues raised by the Motion, the Court found 
that Plaintiff failed to either strictly or substantially comply with Utah's Governmental Immunity 
Act and hence dismissed the Complaint. (See, Addendum " AM) 
Statement of Facts and Disposition 
1. On or about September 21, 1998, Appellant was injured while boarding a Utah 
Transit Authority bus. The entry was wet and the driver left the busstop before Appellant was 
seated, causing her to fall forward onto her knees. Her injuries ultimately required surgery. (Record 
on Appeal at 2) 
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2. On September 22, 1998, David Pitcher (hereinafter "Pitcher") a claims adjuster 
employed by UTA, sent Appellant a letter informing her of personal injury protection benefits 
available to her as a passenger of the UTA bus. On October 25, 1998, Appellant's prior counsel, 
Mitchell R. Jensen, notified Pitcher and UTA of his representation of Appellant. Thereafter, Pitcher 
and Jensen exchanged correspondence concerning Appellant's personal injury claim. (Record at 
13-14) 
3. On August 6, 1999 (with the one-year statute of limitations applicable to 
governmental entities fast approaching), Jensen directed a Notice of Claim to Pitcher. (Record at 
37 and 52.) The Notice was sent to Pitcher per instructions given during one of the telephone calls 
between these individuals. (Record at 52) 
4. Because Appellant's counsel had not yet received all of Ms. Greene's medical records 
prior to submittal of the Notice of Claim, Mr. Jensen followed the Notice with a demand brochure 
and additional supporting information. No response of any kind was received from Pitcher until 
September 24,1999. just three days after the one-year statute of limitations expired. (Record at 52) 
5. Pitcher's September 24,1999, correspondence denied the claim based upon an alleged 
failure to comply with the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11 and 13. More specifically, Pitcher stated, "The notice of claim must be directed and 
delivered to the President or Secretary of the UTA's Board". (Record at 61) 
6. Immediately upon receiving the denial letter, Jensen contacted Pitcher and reminded 
him of the prior direction that this claims adjuster was the appropriate recipient of the Notice of 
Claim. Pitcher responded by denying that any such instruction occurred. (Record at 53,63 and 66) 
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7. Jensen reasonably relied upon Pitcher's instructions when submitting the Notice of 
Claim. (Record at 53) 
8. Appellant's Complaint was filed on October 26,1999. Rather than filing an Answer 
to the Complaint, UTA responded with a Motion to Dismiss premised upon the alleged failure to 
comply with the Governmental Immunity Act. (Record at 1 and 10-11) 
9. The parties filed Memoranda and Affidavits addressing the issues of Pitcher's 
authority to receive the Notice of Claim and further whether he instructed Jensen accordingly. 
However, Appellant requested and received permission to depose certain representatives of UTA 
(Pitcher and its general counsel, Kathryn Pert). In addition to the foregoing, these depositions 
primarily addressed the issue of UTA's policies and practices concerning those instances where 
Pitcher or others within the organization received Notices of Claim. During the course of the 
depositions, Pett and/or Pitcher acknowledged the following: 
a. Pitcher is lone claims administrator at UTA and consequently he receives all 
Notices of Claim without regard to whom they are delivered. He handles claims 
administration both before and after formal notice is received and ofttimes even after 
litigation is instituted. (Record at 195) 
b. At various times during the claims process, Pitcher either negotiates 
settlement or at least recommends such to other members of UTA's heirarchy, 
dependent upon dollar amounts. (Record at 195) 
c. Pitcher acknowledged he takes no action to contact claimants when Notices 
are served upon the wrong person. He stated is the initial recipient of the claims 
notices approximately 40 percent of the time. (Record at 196) 
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d. Pitcher admitted not notifying Jensen of the allegedly improperly served 
Notice of Claim until after the statute of limitations ran. He also admitted 
conversations with Jensen concerning service of the notice. (Record at 196) 
10. Pitcher and Pett's depositions also revealed the existence of a case involving 
substantially similar facts, to wit: Serrato v. Utah Transit Authority, Civil No. 980903929 PI, which 
is presently on appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals as Case No. 990951-C A. (Record at 197) 
While the Serrato case raises somewhat less compelling facts than these proceedings, it reflects a 
course of dealing within UTA where claimants are either innocently or perhaps even intentionally 
told to serve notices upon parties not authorized to accept the same under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. In Serrato, where Pitcher also gave a deposition, testimony was also given that 
claimants represented by counsel were treated differently than those who had retained an attorney. 
(Record at 197 and 198) 
11. The renewed Motion to Dismiss was heard by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod on 
May 16,2000. After oral argument, Judge Henriod took the matter under advisement. On May 23, 
2000, the District Court Judge issued his Minute Entry finding "Plaintiff failed to strictly comply 
with the Act. She has also failed to substantially comply with the Act." As a consequence, he 
dismissed the Complaint with the final Order being entered on June 19, 2000. (Record at 244-247 
and Addendum "B" hereto.) 
12. Plaintiff/Appellant timely filed her Notice of Appeal of the Order of Dismissal on 
July 18, 2000. (Record at 257-258 and Addendum "C" hereto.) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's ruling dismissing Appellant's Complaint. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's Complaint. Teresa Greene did strictly and 
substantially comply with Utah's Governmental Immunity Act and/or UTA is estopped from raising 
any alleged non-compliance due to the actions of its claims adjuster. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTA SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT AS A DEFENSE IN THIS ACTION. 
In both our proceedings and other legal actions, there is substantial overwhelming evidence 
of UTA's having engaged in a knowing, conscious course of action designed to evade payment of 
legitimate personal injury claims which are cognizable under Utah's Governmental Act. Some of 
this evidence is in the form of candid admissions from its general counsel and sole claims adjuster. 
Mr. Pitcher's acknowledged as many as four in ten notices are inappropriately directed to him and 
"deep-sixed" in file. This has saved the Transit Authority hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
payment to otherwise deserving claimants. This is surely not an intended consequence of the 
Immunity Act's strict notice requirements nor should it be blessed by this Court through an 
affirmation of Judge Henriod's dismissal ruling. 
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Notwithstanding his decision, Judge Henriod rightly expressed outrage over UTA's pattern 
of misinformation and concealment, conduct which would have been a violation of Utah's Fair 
Claims Practices Act if Appellee was a typical insurance company. 
This is causing me to have some concern about whether or not people like 
Mr. Pitcher at UTA are intentionally misdirecting people so that the notice 
will be filed inside the statutory time period... I am worried that maybe there 
is a policy there somewhere, that when somebody calls up the claims 
adjuster, the claims adjuster intentionally says, send it to me and doesn't say 
anything about sending it to - you're absolutely right about the statute. And 
I have ruled before and granted your motion. (Hearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, January 26,2000, at page 15) 
Doesn't Mr. Pitcher's standard way of handling these claims bother you a 
little? It bothers me. It really does. If he was a lawyer, we wouldn't allow 
it to go on for a second. He's had this job for a long time. Sounds to me like 
he gets a claim, he could very well initiate negotiations simply to drag it out 
past the point where a claim can't be filed. It troubles me. (Continuation of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, May 16,2000, at page 19) 
UTA having saved $200,000 to $300,000 in payment on such claims not only supports Ms. 
Greene's contention that this is an intentional, not merely negligent, course of conduct, it further 
demonstrates how contrary Appellee's actions are to the spirit and purpose behind the Governmental 
Immunity Act itself. UTA as a governmental entity has a responsibility to protect its citizens, in this 
particular instance, a rider. It must treat them justly and fairly. Such an intent is blatantly obvious 
when one looks at the waiver of immunity for the types of negligent acts asserted by Ms. Greene 
against Appellee's bus driver. If the Court rejects this appeal, it will foster a climate of non-
disclosure and misinformation to otherwise deserving injured parties. But not only is UTA's 
conduct contrary to the obvious purposes behind the Act, it runs counter to prior pronouncements 
of this Court or the Court of Appeals in similar, although even less compelling circumstances. 
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In particular, the case of Bischel vs. Merritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) reflects the 
Court of Appeals' position that the governmental entities' conduct should not cause a notice of claim 
to be misdirected. "It appears at best disingenuous for the County to argue that Bischel's notice was 
inadequate merely because she directed and delivered it as the County Commission and County 
Attorney's office instructed. The public deserves more consistent, more credible treatment from its 
servants." Id. at 279. As the Court may gather from the foregoing quote, in Bischel the injured party 
contacted an agent of the governmental entity and was directed to send the otherwise adequate notice 
of claim to the individual responsible for investigation and settlement. However, similar to our 
circumstances, this individual (there the County Attorney, here Dave Pitcher) was not the party 
identified in the Act to be the recipient of a notice. Under these "unique facts" the Court of Appeals 
found the government should be estopped from challenging Plaintiffs compliance with Utah's 
Government Immunity Act. 
What distinguishes Ms. Greene's treatment at the hands of UTA from Bischel's "unique 
facts" and makes it more compelling case for application of estoppel principals is the course of 
conduct which Serrate and Appellant uncovered during discovery. No where in Bischel is there 
mention of a governmental policy of either misdirecting claimants or failing to notify injured parties 
of inappropriately served notices of claim. There is no suggestion in the cited case of county 
employees having a consistent pattern of abuse like that of Mr. Pitcher. Nor did the county attorney 
recognize she was saving her employer $200,000 to $300,000.2 
2It has come to Appellant's attention that another example of UTA misdirecting service of 
notices of claim is working its way through Utah's courts. In Koch vs. Utah Transit Authority, 
Civil No. 970904524 PI, in the Second District Court, similar if not identical issues were raised 
concerning these practices. 
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In applying estoppel to our circumstances and in validating the Notice of Claim served upon 
Mr. Pitcher, it is important to recognize that the Notice itself is otherwise in compliance with the 
Act. This is something that even UTA has not challenged, nor does it contend that "actual notice" 
was not received or, finally, that the Notice was untimely. Consequently, Ms. Greene has fully 
satisfied the purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act. "The primary purpose of the notice of 
claim is to "afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely 
investigation of the merits of a notice." Belonio vs. Salt Lake City Corp.. 911 P.2d 1294,1297 (Utah 
App. 1996). 
As inBrittainvs.State. 882 P.2d 666,668 (Utah App. 1994), Pitcher (the Notice's recipient) 
was indeed the individual within UTA's organization who would investigate and evaluate the claim. 
As testified to during his deposition if the Notice had been delivered to the statutorily mandated 
person, he still would have ultimately received the same for purposes of settlement. (Record at 195) 
Pitcher handles administration of the claim both before and after the formal notice is received. 
Should litigation be instituted, at which point the file is transferred to the legal department, Pitcher 
is still involved in evaluation and advising counsel. The claims adjuster actually retains the physical 
original file. Simply put, the party who here received the Notice of Claim has all-encompassing 
involvement on a personal injury file, from beginning to end. UTA should not contend Appellant 
did not comply with and satisfy the acknowledged purposes behind the Governmental Immunity 
Act.3 
3For other cases where the court has validated a possibly improper notice of claim if it 
otherwise satisfied the purposes of the Act, See generally: Yates vs. Vernal Family Health 
Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980) and Stahl vs. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1980). Cf. Scarborough vs. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) and Belonio vs. 
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Prior precedent construing Utah's Governmental Immunity Act makes it difficult to analyze 
what will or will not pass muster or otherwise excuse a plaintiff from full and complete compliance 
in serving a notice of claim. At times, the distinctions drawn are artificial. For instance, compare 
Bischel with Belonio. In both, the claimant or counsel contacted the governmental entity for help 
in determining to whom the notice should be delivered. Yet the results were different. To avoid 
directly overruling BischeL the Court of Appeals in Belonio "elucidated" upon its earlier opinion. 
It did so by highlighting the "unique set of facts" which were apparently absent in the latter 
decision.4 
The pending appeal offers the Court an opportunity to better clarify prior rulings with an eye 
towards consistency. From the number of cases being appealed on issues concerning compliance 
with the Governmental Immunity Act, it is obvious the rules are a maze and trap for the unwary and 
even experienced plaintiffs counsel. Incomprehensible rulings founded upon overly technical 
interpretations of the Act deprived otherwise deserving claimants of compensation for their personal 
injuries. This inequitable result is particularly unfair where the cause of the mistake is an intentional 
or even innocent misdirection from an agent of the governmental entity itself. 
In making this argument, Appellant is well aware of the general rule requiring strict 
compliance with the Acts dictates and demands. Exceptions to this rule are very limited. 
Scarborough vs. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). As suggested above, Ms. 
Greene humbly submits that our set of facts are unique and are encompassed within one of the 
Salt Lake City Corp.. 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996). 
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limited exceptions, such as that announced in Bischel. This clarification can occur without upsetting 
the Court's long-standing rule requiring strict compliance with the Act. 
But in taking this position, Ms. Greene must still confront Judge Henriod's ruling that 
Appellant did not even substantially comply with the statute. (See Record at 244) 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
WHEN SERVING HER NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
The Bischel opinion, upon which Appellant primarily relies, summarizes and discusses 
earlier cases concerning notice requirements under the Act. Consistent with cases cited at 907 P.2d 
279, Ms. Greene's Notice was not defective in form or content. It was served within the one-year 
period required. And perhaps most important, though served upon someone other than the 
"President or Secretary of the Board" UTA had actual notice of the claim through Mr. Pitcher who 
would have handled its investigation, evaluation and settlement in any event.5 
It therefore is clear that Judge Henriod's ruling that Ms. Greene's notice to substantially 
comply with the Act was erroneous. Appellant more than substantially complied, she strictly 
complied, with the possible lone exception of some deficit as to whom it was directed and delivered. 
And this shortcoming is attributable to UTA's own agent. 
5UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(D). 
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CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the trial court's thinly veiled outrage and concern over UTA's policy of 
misinformation and concealment, Judge Henriod dismissed the Complaint finding a failure to strictly 
or even substantially comply with Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. This decision was erroneous 
under governing authority and contrary the Legislature's purpose of waiving immunity for negligent 
acts. Perhaps worse than denying a worthy claimant of compensation for her injuries, Judge Henriod 
has allowed a governmental entity to get away with a course of misleading conduct lately against 
its duties of serving and protecting the public. 
Based on the above, Teresa Greene respectfully urges the Court to reverse the lower court's 
dismissal of the Complaint and remand these proceedings for a trial on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2E 02. day of October, 2000. 
Mfchael ATKatz 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Appellantf 
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A. Katz. appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final order of the Honorable Stephen Henriod 
entered in this matter on June 19, 2000. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
EY. C:?'J:Y CLEHK 
DATED this I /5^~da.v of July, 2000. 
MICHAEL F. RICHMAN& ASSOCIATES 
Michael A. Katz ' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Jdj-7/L' day of July , 2000,1 served Plaintiff and Appellant's 
NOTICE OF APPEAL upon counsel for the Defendant and Appellee in this matter, by mailing first 
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Scott C. Sandberg 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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